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ARTICLE
DROUGHT AND PUBLIC NECESSITY:
CAN A COMMON-LAW “STICK”
INCREASE FLEXIBILITY IN
WESTERN WATER LAW?
by: Robin Kundis Craig*
ABSTRACT
Drought is a recurring—and likely increasing—challenge to water rights administration in western states under the prior appropriation doctrine, where
“first in time” senior rights are often allocated to non-survival uses such as
commercial agriculture, rather than to drinking water supply for cities. While
states and localities facing severe drought have used a variety of voluntary
programs to reallocate water, these programs by their very nature cannot
guarantee that water will in fact be redistributed to the uses that best promote
public health and community survival. In addition, pure market solutions run
the risk that “survival water” will become too expensive to buy because prices
naturally rise—sometimes dramatically—during shortages.
Using the example of the Brazos River drought of 2010 to 2013, this Article
explores the potential role of the common law doctrine of public necessity in
reallocating water during extreme drought. Building on my earlier work examining the potential use of public necessity in climate change adaptation for
water law and coasts, this Article nevertheless focuses more narrowly on the
specific issue of water crisis—the moment during an extreme drought when
cities and power plants face a real inability to supply the general public with
drinking water and electricity. At that moment, and assuming that cities have
otherwise reasonably prepared for drought, the doctrine of public necessity
should allow state water agencies in western states to reallocate water away
from senior water rights holders whose water rights are for non-survival uses.
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INTRODUCTION

In early 2018, the long-time spectral threat of cities running out of
water became a reality. Cape Town, South Africa, faced its impending
“Day Zero”—the day when all public water supplies are shut off.1 The
exact date of Day Zero has fluctuated in response to limited rain and
citizen water conservation efforts; in February 2018, at the height of
the drought, the date was projected to fall between May 112 and July
9, 2018,3 but rains soon after put off the crisis point to sometime in
2019.4 Nevertheless, the plans for Day Zero rationing had become
fairly detailed: While “[h]ospitals and other vital institutions in the
city center will still get water, . . . the majority of residents will have to
line up at communal water points to collect their daily allotment of 6.6
gallons . . . under the gaze of armed guards.”5 Humans can survive on
about one gallon of water (3.7 liters) per day,6 but Cape Town’s projected daily allotment fell far short of the United Nations’ and World
Health Organization’s calculation that each person needs 13.2 to 26.4
1. Aryn Baker, When the Taps Run Dry, TIME, Feb. 19, 2018, at 30, 33.
2. Id.
3. Zeeshan Aleem, Cape Town Is Bracing for “Day Zero”—the Day It Cuts off
Running Water for 4 Million People, VOX, https://www.vox.com/world/2018/2/9/
16964416/cape-town-water-crisis-day-zero-south-africa (last updated Feb. 21, 2018,
12:24 PM) [https://perma.cc/4B6Q-U9WL].
4. Ed Stoddard, Cape Town ‘Day Zero’ Pushed Back to 2019 as Dams Fill up in
South Africa, REUTERS, (April 3, 2018, 7:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ussafrica-drought/cape-town-day-zero-pushed-back-to-2019-as-dams-fill-up-in-south-af
rica-idUSKCN1HA1LN [https://perma.cc/8UYS-KNCY].
5. Baker, supra note 1.
6. Water: How Much Should You Drink Every Day?, MAYO CLINIC, https://www
.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/nutrition-and-healthy-eating/in-depth/water/art-2004
4256 (last visited Feb. 25, 2018), [https://perma.cc/F59S-VEHV].
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gallons (50 to 100 liters) of water every day to meet basic drinking,
cooking, and sanitation needs.7
Cape Town is unlikely to remain the only city facing such water
supply crises in the near future. As National Geographic reported in
February 2018, several major cities around the world have come close
to Cape Town’s experience as a result of climate change and drought:
Already, many of the 21 million residents of Mexico City only have
running water part of the day, while one in five get just a few hours
from their taps a week. Several major cities in India don’t have
enough. Water managers in Melbourne, Australia, reported last
summer that they could run out of water in little more than a decade. Jakarta is running so dry that the city is sinking faster than seas
are rising, as residents suck up groundwater from below the surface.
Much like Cape Town’s fiasco, reservoirs in Sao Paulo, Brazil,
dropped so low in 2015 that pipes drew in mud, emergency water
trucks were looted, and the flow of water to taps in many homes
was cut to just a few hours twice a week. Only last-minute rains
prevented Brazilian authorities from having to close taps
completely.8

Nor is the United States immune from the threat of severe drought.
For example, in 2014, the third year of severe drought in California
prevented the State Water Project—“the backbone of California’s
water system”—from delivering water from the Sacramento Bay
Delta to farms and cities farther south for the first time in the project’s
54-year history.9 While communities ordinarily dependent on the project could temporarily turn to other sources, like groundwater,10 the
2012–2016 California drought is the latest example of why water lawyers and policymakers in the United States should be thinking about
legal doctrines that can allow governments to reallocate water in
emergency drought situations to facilitate human survival and wellbeing. Such consideration is especially worthwhile for the American
West, where: (1) drought is more common than in the East; (2) climate change is generally making western states hotter and drier, in7. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation: Media Brief, U.N. 1, 2 (July 2010),
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/pdf/human_right_to_water_and_sanitation_me
dia_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/L47N-RJPU].
8. Craig Welch, Why Cape Town Is Running out of Water, and Who’s Next,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 2, 2018), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/02/
cape-town-running-out-of-water-drought-taps-shutoff-other-cities/ [https://perma.cc/
A7CG-D5LJ].
9. Paul Rogers, California Drought: State Water Project Will Deliver No Water
This Summer, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.mercurynews.com/2014/
01/31/california-drought-state-water-project-will-deliver-no-water-this-summer/
[https://perma.cc/J83N-KA6V].
10. Id. (“The announcement does not mean that communities will have no water
this summer. But it does mean that every region is largely on its own now and will
have to rely on water stored in local reservoirs, pumped from underground wells,
recycled water and conservation to satisfy demand.”).
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creasing the likelihood of more frequent and longer-term drought (or
a “new normal” of less water);11 (3) much of the water—often 80% or
more—is allocated through prior appropriation’s “first in time, first in
right” priority system to uses (most notably agriculture) other than
drinking water and power generation;12 and (4) most rivers and lakes
11. The effect is particularly pronounced in the Southwest. In its 2014 National
Climate Assessment, the U.S. Global Change Research Program concluded for the
Southwest that:
Climate changes pose challenges for an already parched region that is expected to get hotter and, in its southern half, significantly drier. Increased
heat and changes to rain and snowpack will send ripple effects throughout
the region’s critical agriculture sector, affecting the lives and economies of
56 million people—a population that is expected to increase 68% by 2050, to
94 million. Severe and sustained drought will stress water sources, already
over-utilized in many areas, forcing increasing competition among farmers,
energy producers, urban dwellers, and plant and animal life for the region’s
most precious resource.
U.S. Global Change Research Program, Regions: Southwest: Introduction, NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT (2014), https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/regions/southwest
[https://perma.cc/XSR7-HJDE]. The message is more mixed for the Northwest, but
summer water shortages are projected:
Observed regional warming has been linked to changes in the timing and
amount of water availability in basins with significant snowmelt contributions to streamflow. Since around 1950, area-averaged snowpack on April 1
in the Cascade Mountains decreased about 20%, spring snowmelt occurred 0
to 30 days earlier depending on location, late winter/early spring streamflow
increases ranged from 0% to greater than 20% as a fraction of annual flow,
and summer flow decreased 0% to 15% as a fraction of annual flow, with
exceptions in smaller areas and shorter time periods.
Hydrologic response to climate change will depend upon the dominant form
of precipitation in a particular watershed, as well as other local characteristics including elevation, aspect, geology, vegetation, and changing land use.
The largest responses are expected to occur in basins with significant snow
accumulation, where warming increases winter flows and advances the timing of spring melt. By 2050, snowmelt is projected to shift three to four
weeks earlier than the 20th century average, and summer flows are projected
to be substantially lower, even for an emissions scenario that assumes substantial emissions reductions (B1). In some North Cascade rivers, a significant fraction (10% to 30%) of late summer flow originates as glacier melt;
the consequences of eventual glacial disappearance are not well quantified.
Basins with a significant groundwater component may be less responsive to
climate change than indicated here.
U.S. Global Change Research Program, Regions: Northwest: Water-related Challenges, NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT (2014), https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/
regions/northwest#statement-16996 [https://perma.cc/PD6X-GWU6] (citations
omitted).
12. In Utah, for example, 82% of the water in the state is allocated to agriculture.
John Hollenhorst, 82 Percent of Utah Water Goes to Farmers—Here’s Why, KSL
(June 12, 2015, 8:44 PM), https://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=35054495 [https://perma
.cc/ZT2Q-4JM9]. In Colorado, agriculture uses 85%. Bruce Finley, Colorado Farmers
Grow More Food on Less Water Amid Rising Competition, DENVER POST (Aug. 1,
2015), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/08/01/colorado-farmers-grow-more-food-onless-water-amid-rising-competition/ [https://perma.cc/RRH7-KU96]. In California, agriculture uses 80%. Jeff Guo, Agriculture Is 80 Percent of Water Use in California.
Why Aren’t Farmers Being Asked to Cut Back?, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2015), https://
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are fully or over-appropriated,13 meaning that there is little to no elasticity left in these systems to cope with severe drought.
Prior appropriation is well-known for creating tensions between city
dwellers and other water users even before droughts become critical.
In 2003, for example, along the Musselshell River in eastern Montana,
the town of Harlowtown had to “ration[ ] water for gardening and car
washing, [while] a rancher high above the river bottom maintain[ed] a
lush crop of alfalfa with endless pipes and sprinklers.”14 Drought,
however, heightens these tensions and, more importantly, can eventually threaten public health and human lives.
The end of the first decade of the 21st century was a dry time for the
Brazos River, which runs southeast from central Texas near Dallas to
the Gulf of Mexico, emptying into the ocean just south of Freeport. In
2011, the region experienced the worst one-year drought in its history.15 “Statewide agricultural losses added up to $7.62 billion. Farmers saw their crops wither in the field and ranchers, faced with limited
food for their cattle, were forced to cull their herds or travel out of
state to secure hay at a higher expense.”16 The Brazos River ran dry in
the summer,17 and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
(“TCEQ”), the state agency that manages surface water appropriative
rights for the state, began to curtail junior water rights holders in May
2011.18

www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/04/03/agriculture-is-80-percent-ofwater-use-in-california-why-arent-farmers-being-forced-to-cut-back/?utm_term=.2b20
fb095158 [https://perma.cc/6EMC-RALM].
13. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & CONSENSUS BLDG. INST., WATER IN THE
AMERICAN WEST: 150 YEARS OF ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES 21–23 (2012), http://
naturalresourcespolicy.org/docs/water-in-the-west.pdf [https://perma.cc/6F68-3BZL];
Edella Schlager, Challenges of Governing Groundwater in U.S. Western States, 14
HYDROGEOLOGY J. 350, 350–51 (Mar. 2006).
14. Elizabeth Arnold, The Battle Over Water Rights: In the West, the Oldest Claims
Take Precedence, NPR (Aug. 28, 2003), https://www.npr.org/programs/atc/features/
2003/aug/water/part3.html [https://perma.cc/ST4F-6KSB].
15. Record Drought Appears to Be Sputtering to an End, BRAZOS RIVER AUTH.
(2012), http://www.brazos.org/Newsletter/Spring-2012/Record-Drought [https://perma
.cc/T7XN-46K7]. See also Officials: Texas Has Not Surpassed Drought of Record—
Yet, BRAZOS RIVER AUTH. (2012), http://www.brazos.org/Newsletter/Summer-2012/
Drought-of-Record [https://perma.cc/6GRU-J55K] (“From October 2010 to September 2011, Texas also broke the record set in 1956 during the drought of record for
driest 12-month period . . . .”) [hereinafter Texas Has Not Surpassed Drought].
16. Texas Has Not Surpassed Drought, supra note 15.
17. Caitlyn Kennedy, Brazos River Runs Dry During Texas Drought, NAT’L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/featured-images/brazos-river-runs-dry-during-texas-drought [https://perma.cc/
AF9K-HDUS].
18. TCEQ Restricts Junior Water Rights in Brazos River Basin, BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, P.C. (May 2011), http://www.bdlaw.com/news-1141.html [https://perma.cc/
2LAZ-S99L].
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Although the region experienced a brief respite in Spring 2012 during La Niña conditions,19 drought conditions continued to affect water
rights into 2013.20 Most notably, in November 2012, Dow Chemical
Company (“Dow”), “the senior water rights holder on the Brazos[,]
made a priority call, asserting it could not obtain all of the water it was
entitled to due to diversions by upstream users.”21 Dow “is by far the
largest water user on the Brazos, which also supplies farmers and
ranchers, cities and other industries along its 900-mile stretch . . . .”22
Its plant, set up in 1940, extracts magnesium from seawater, using
100,000 gallons per minute of Brazos River water in the process.23 Importantly, the plant is located in Freeport, at the very end of the
river,24 meaning that when Dow calls its senior water rights, it can
effectively limit water withdrawals by everyone else along the river.
On November 19, 2012, in response to Dow’s call, TCEQ suspended a long list of water rights junior to Dow’s.25 However, it did
not suspend water rights for non-exempt domestic use, and it refused
to suspend upstream junior water rights for municipal use and power
generation “due to concerns about public health, safety, and welfare.”26 The Texas Farm Bureau, representing the suspended junior
water rights holders, filed suit.27 TCEQ lifted the suspension in January 2013, but the lawsuit continued.28 In June 2013, the Travis County
District Court granted summary judgment to the Texas Farm Bureau
in a bench ruling.29 In April 2015, the Texas Court of Appeals in
Corpus Christi affirmed, and in early 2016, the Texas Supreme Court
19. Record Drought Appears to Be Sputtering to an End, BRAZOS RIVER AUTH.
(2012), http://www.brazos.org/Newsletter/Spring-2012/Record-Drought [https://perma
.cc/T7XN-46K7].
20. Brazos River Priority-Call Area, TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, https://
www.tceq.texas.gov/response/drought/priority.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/E39V-4LXA].
21. Karen M. Hansen, Latest Development on Brazos River Senior Water Rights
Call, ENVTL. L. PORTAL (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.environmentallawportal.com/
texas-brazos-river-water-rights-seniority-and-priority-of-uses [https://perma.cc/J7YECKGK]; Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. Tex. Farm Bureau, 460 S.W.3d 264, 267
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, pet. denied).
22. Jim Malewitz, In Major Water Case, Win for Ranchers Is Loss for Cities, TEX.
TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/02/19/major-water-case-winfarmers-loss-cities/ [https://perma.cc/7XD9-88MN].
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ORDER SUSPENDING WATER RIGHTS ON
THE BRAZOS RIVER 2 ¶ 7, 3 ¶ 5, appx. A (2012), https://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/
public/response/drought/water-right-letters/11-19-12brazos-suspension-order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7E3Z-46S9] [hereinafter TCEQ NOV. 2012 BRAZOS RIVER ORDER].
26. Id. at 2 ¶¶ 9–10, 3 ¶¶ 6–7.
27. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. Tex. Farm Bureau, 460 S.W.3d 264, 267
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, pet. denied).
28. Hansen, supra note 21.
29. Id.
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refused to review the case,30 ending the TCEQ’s ability to argue for
more drought flexibility.
However, Dow called the river again in June 2013. As part of the
original suspension, the TCEQ had surveyed the upstream municipalities and power plants to see which ones needed Brazos River water—
and how much. As a result, it issued a much more nuanced suspension
order in July 2013 that, nevertheless, again refused to suspend some
junior water rights for domestic use, municipal use, and power generation, again citing concerns for public health, safety, and welfare.31
The Brazos River case thus squarely raises the question of what authority water agencies in the West should have to reallocate appropriative water rights in response to drought. Building on some of my
earlier work,32 this Article suggests that the common law doctrine of
public necessity should provide a necessary legal “stick” to limit nonsurvival-related senior water rights holders (i.e., those who hold water
rights for industrial, business, and commercial agriculture) in order to
encourage flexibility and to promote community survival priorities—
drinking water and power supply—during drought. Specifically, this
Article argues that the TCEQ’s second suspension order in July 2013
was justified under the common law doctrine of public necessity.
This Article begins in Section II with an overview of prior appropriation law and its relationship to drought, noting several doctrinal aspects that limit state water agencies’ flexibility. Section III then
provides a review of California’s and Texas’s voluntary water banks,
emphasizing that the success of these voluntary systems for reallocating water rights is not guaranteed and can turn on factors outside of
the water agency’s control. Section IV systematically examines the
common law doctrine of public necessity, including its past application
to drought situations. In Section V, this Article argues that western
states should more openly embrace the public necessity doctrine in
drought situations to ensure that drought does not create public
health emergencies, effectively prioritizing human life over other
water uses during truly severe droughts.

30. Tex. Farm Bureau, 460 S.W.3d at 273.
31. TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ORDER SUSPENDING AND ADJUSTING
WATER RIGHTS IN THE BRAZOS RIVER BASIN FOR A SENIOR CALL 1–14 (2013),
https://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/response/drought/water-right-letters/07-0213Brazos-order.pdf [https://perma.cc/E64C-TRDS] [hereinafter TCEQ JULY 2013
BRAZOS RIVER ORDER].
32. See generally Symposium, Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting Water Law to Public
Necessity: Reframing Climate Change Adaptation as Emergency Preparedness and Response, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 709 (2010) (arguing that the doctrine of public necessity
can aid climate change adaptation efforts in connection with water); Robin Kundis
Craig, Public Trust and Public Necessity Defenses to Taking Liability for Sea-Level
Rise Responses on the Gulf Coast, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395 (2011) (applying
the public necessity doctrine to coastal retreat).
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The term “water right” generally refers to a right to remove fresh
water from its natural watercourse and to use that water for some
consumptive purpose, such as irrigation, drinking water, or industrial
manufacturing. Because water law is largely state law, the exact principles and requirements governing the withdrawal and use of water
can vary considerably depending on location. In the United States, the
perpetually drought-threatened western states rejected the common
law tradition of riparianism, where water rights are based on riparian
land ownership,33 in favor of the prior appropriation doctrine.34 Prior
appropriation operates on a principle of “first in time, first in right”—
i.e., the first user to apply water to a beneficial use, without waste or
abandonment, acquires a continuing right to keep using water superior to that of later users drawing water from the same source.35 In
times of limited water supplies, the junior users—the users who acquired their water rights later in time—must entirely cease to use
water before senior users have to curtail their water use at all.36 At the
height of the 2012–2016 California drought, for example, the California Water Resources Control Board sent water shortage notices to
water rights holders with priority dates as old as 1858,37 curtailing senior water rights that had never before been cut off.38
While low-rain and drought years have long limited water use in the
West, the new, drier normal of climate change is making drought both
a more regular and a worse reality for prior appropriation states.39 As
one example, by 2014 the California drought of 2012–2016 had al-

33. George A. Gould, Water Rights Systems, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE EASTERN
UNITED STATES 7, 8–9 (Kenneth R. Wright ed., 1998).
34. Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 250-51;
Richard F. Ricci, Franklin W. Boenning & Kristina D. Pasko, Battles Over Eastern
Water, 21 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 38, 38 (2006).
35. E.g., State ex rel. Office of State Eng’r v. Lewis, 150 P.3d 375, 383 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2006); Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d 281, 284 (Colo. App. 2006); W. Maricopa
Combine, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., 26 P.3d 1171, 1180 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001);
Hawley v. Kan. Dep’t of Agric., 132 P.3d 870, 873 (Kan. 2006).
36. ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., MODERN WATER LAW: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS 176 (2d ed. 2018).
37. Cal. Water Resources Control Bd., 2015 Summary of Water Shortage Notices
(2015), https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/drought/
docs/curtail_summary_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X9U-572P].
38. Dale Kasler & Ryan Sabalow, California Curtails Senior Water Rights, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 12, 2015), http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/water-anddrought/article23849281.html [https://perma.cc/X2S2-S4CX].
39. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN
THE UNITED STATES (2014), https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report [https://perma
.cc/9F3D-WJRA].

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL104.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 9

6-DEC-18

DROUGHT AND PUBLIC NECESSITY

14:21

85

ready registered as the driest three-year period in California’s reconstructed precipitation history.40 The drought set other records, as well:
The drought occurred at a time of record warmth in California, with
new climate records set in 2014 for statewide average temperatures.
Records for minimum annual precipitation were set in many communities in calendar year 2013. Calendar year 2014 saw record-low
water allocations for State Water Project and federal Central Valley
Project contractors. Reduced surface water availability triggered increased groundwater pumping, with groundwater levels in many
parts of the state dropping 50 to 100 feet below their previous historical lows.41

Thus, new drought conditions are creating issues of how best to reallocate increasingly scarce water supplies previously allocated as property rights through the prior appropriation system.
Law needs flexibility to deal with these changing hydrological realities.42 However, prior appropriation doctrine and other aspects of
western water law often get in the way. For example, state water agencies’ flexibility in dealing with drought is reduced because most water
in the West is tied up in private and governmental property and contractual rights; thus, reallocation of water use and water priorities is
both economically expensive and legally and politically challenging.43
Indeed, in 2009, the United States Global Change Research Program
(“USGCRP”) identified several “institutional and legal barriers” that
hinder necessary changes in water allocation and use—many of which
derive from the complex property rights matrices surrounding water.44
As the Program explained:
40. CAL. STATE WATER RESOURCES DEP’T, CALIFORNIA’S MOST SIGNIFICANT
DROUGHTS: COMPARING HISTORICAL AND RECENT CONDITIONS (2015), https://www
.water.ca.gov/LegacyFiles/waterconditions/docs/California_Signficant_Droughts_2015
_small.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CEE-T4RP].
41. Id.
42. Robin Kundis Craig et al., Balancing Stability and Flexibility in Adaptive Governance: The New Challenges and a Review of Tools Available, 22 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y
1 (April 2017), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol22/iss2/art3/ [https://perma.cc/
BF4E-96SH].
43. Abrahm Lustgarten & ProPublica, A Free-Market Plan to Save the American
West From Drought, ATLANTIC, (Mar. 2016) https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2016/03/a-plan-to-save-the-american-west-from-drought/426846/ [https://per
ma.cc/BE5G-NDMG] (“In theory, states could step in and reallocate water according
to modern economic priorities. After all, the West’s millions of acres of farmland
account for less than 2 percent of the region’s economic output, and moving just 10
percent of the water off farms would likely resolve current shortfalls. Few things are
more controversial in the West, though, than even minor meddling with water laws.
Canceling or redistributing rights that are more than a century old would be political
suicide in a part of the country where personal property is sacrosanct and farmers
wield a lot of influence. As water shortages have slowly worsened over the past two
decades, politicians have done little to avert the crisis.”).
44. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 49 (2009), http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usim
pacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PUJ-3B3R].
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• The allocation of water in many interstate rivers is governed by
compacts, international treaties, federal laws, court decrees, and
other agreements that are difficult to modify.
• Reservoir operations are governed by “rule curves” that require
a certain amount of space to be saved in a reservoir at certain
times of year to capture a potential flood. Developed by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers based on historical flood data, many
of these rule curves have never been modified, and modifications might require Environmental Impact Statements.
• In most parts of the West, water is allocated based on a “first in
time means first in right” system, and because agriculture was
developed before cities were established, large volumes of water
typically are allocated to agriculture. Transferring agricultural
rights to municipalities, even for short periods during drought,
can involve substantial expense and time and can be socially
divisive.
• Conserving water does not necessarily lead to a right to that
saved water, thus creating a disincentive for conservation.45

Moreover, as if to drive home the critical connection between water
scarcity governance flexibility and the law defining property rights in
water, the USGCRP emphasized that “[t]he ability to modify operational rules and water allocations is likely to be critical for the protection of infrastructure, for public safety, to ensure reliability of water
delivery, and to protect the environment.”46
Of course, one aspect of drought flexibility should be water planning, and water agencies’ ability to invoke the doctrine of public necessity should not excuse cities who fail to plan for drought. However,
planning for drought can take cities only so far. First, under prior appropriation’s anti-speculation doctrine, cities (like all appropriators)
can claim water rights for both future growth and future drought only
to a point—i.e., only to the extent of their reasonably projected future
water needs.47 As a result, an extended and unprecedented drought—
especially in a climate change era—could legitimately catch even the
most diligently prepared city off guard. For example, the California
drought of 2012–2016 turned out to be the worst drought California
had experienced in 1,200 years48—a historical measure far outside the
planning ken of municipalities.
45. Id. at 49–50.
46. Id. at 49.
47. Sandra Zellmer, The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Its Implications for Collaborative Water Management, 8 NEV. L.J. 994, 997–98 (2008); Scott A. Clark & Alix
L. Joseph, Changes of Water Rights and the Anti-Speculation Doctrine: The Continued
Importance of Actual Beneficial Use, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 553, 555–62 (2006).
48. Zachary P. Sugg, An Equity Autopsy: Exploring the Role of Water Rights in
Water Allocations and Impacts for the Central Valley Project During the 2012–2016
California Drought, 7 RES. 12, at 1 (2018).
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Second, groundwater pumping—one of the most common “solutions” to diminished surface water supplies during drought—is unlikely to remain a viable drought mitigation measure for cities in many
parts of the country because groundwater resources are increasingly
being mined (pumped beyond their recharge rate49) or even destroyed.50 Thus, again, even diligent cities are increasingly likely to
find themselves without alternative sources of emergency public supply during a record drought.
Third, traditional appropriation law provides few readily available
options for quickly reallocating water in the face of a drought emergency.51 Although western water rights are property rights, they are
not freely alienable when the owner wants to change the beneficial
use of the water (e.g., agriculture to municipal supply) or the place of
use (e.g., farm to city). Especially in fully or over-appropriated rivers,
downstream water users are dependent on the exact pattern of upstream withdrawals and return flows. Changing the point of diversion,
the beneficial use for a water right, the amount of return flow, or the
point where the return flow enters the river can alter the overall river
flow pattern and harm other water users in the same system. Legally,
these changes in how or where a water right is exercised are generally
known as water right transfers, and “[a] transfer is subject to the condition that a change in use must not injure any other water rights
holder. This ‘no injury’ rule is the only universal restriction on water
transfers,”52 but many western states also impose other limitations on
water right transfers beyond the “no injury” requirement.53 As a result, water right transfers are neither easy nor quick, and prior appropriation law effectively limits the availability of real-time market
mechanisms for reallocating water on an emergency basis during
drought.
Thus, prior appropriation law and the changing realities of water
resources pose several obstacles both to cities trying to plan for a true
drought of record and to quick and easy market exchanges during
such a drought. The next Section explores attempted voluntary solu49. Dennis Dimick, If You Think the Water Crisis Can’t Get Worse, Wait Until the
Aquifers Are Drained, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 21, 2014), https://news.nationalgeo
graphic.com/news/2014/08/140819-groundwater-california-drought-aquifers-hidden-cri
sis/ [https://perma.cc/4ZVP-K6GD].
50. Chris Draper, California’s Excessive Pumping During Drought Could Permanently Destroy Aquifers, GLITCH.NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.glitch.news/201509-15-californias-excessive-pumping-during-drought-could-permanently-destroy-aqui
fers.html [https://perma.cc/4T2F-M7UT]; Vast Areas of California Are Sinking As
Groundwater Is Pumped in Drought, GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.the
guardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/19/california-sinking-groundwater-pumped-drought
[https://perma.cc/4N73-NYLL].
51. See Zellmer, supra note 47, at 1011–12.
52. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY,
EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 71 (1992).
53. Id.
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tions to these quandaries in California and Texas, demonstrating that
these purported “fixes” also do not guarantee the protection of public
health and human life during a drought emergency.
III. VOLUNTARY MEASURES TO REALLOCATE WATER IN RECENT
WESTERN DROUGHTS: THE EXAMPLES OF CALIFORNIA’S
AND TEXAS’S WATER BANKS
Cities, counties, and states in the West can rely upon numerous voluntary and involuntary measures during a drought to reduce water
use, from restrictions on lawn-watering to incentives to buy low-flow
toilets and showerheads.54 However, these demand-reducing measures, while necessary and an important first step, do not actually reallocate water rights. This Section examines voluntary measures that do
reallocate water—specifically, the use of water banks in California
and Texas. Water banks are state-operated mechanisms that allow
water rights holders to voluntarily transfer water rights, temporarily
or permanently, to other uses. California has repeatedly used water
banks as a drought-specific reallocation mechanism, while Texas continually operates a more general water bank.
A. Drought Water Banks in California
California has faced repeated droughts in the late 20th century and
first decades of the 21st century and has tried to generate voluntary
programs to cope. For example, it repeatedly used voluntary Drought
Water Banks to facilitate water transfers55 and to reallocate water
during various drought events.
1. Drought Water Bank, 1991–1993
In response to California’s drought from 1991–1993, the California
Department of Water Resources (“CDWR”) instituted a Drought
Water Bank.56 “Buy-and-sell agreements were developed by Department staff, and the [Drought Water Bank] began to purchase water. In
using the [Drought Water Bank], buyers and sellers sought to take
advantage of economies of scale and avoid the high transaction costs
and third-party effects of individually negotiated transactions.”57
54. See, e.g., Holly Heinrich, How 10 Western Cities Are Dealing With Water Scarcity and Drought, NPR STATEIMPACT TEX. (Aug. 2, 2013), https://stateimpact.npr.org/
texas/2013/08/02/how-10-western-cities-are-dealing-with-water-scarcity-and-drought/
[https://perma.cc/5ERM-EJP3] (detailing a variety of methods).
55. Ronald A. Kaiser, Texas Water Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal Analysis, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 181, 187–88 (1996).
56. Id. (citing DAVID MITCHELL, BAY AREA ECON. FORUM & METRO. WATER
DIST. OF S. CAL., WATER MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA (1992); RICHARD HOWITT ET
AL., CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., A RETROSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA’S 1991 EMERGENCY DROUGHT WATER BANK (1992); SHARING SCARCITY: GAINERS AND LOSERS
IN WATER MARKETING (Harold O. Carter et al. eds. 1994)).
57. Id. at 188.
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The 1991–1993 Drought Water Bank is generally considered a success in terms of achieving California’s water reallocation goals.58 The
Bank “purchased 820,655 acre-feet of water in 1991 and 193,193 acrefeet in 1992. More favorable weather conditions, spring rains, a mild
summer, and urban water conservation measures contributed to the
lower amount of water purchased in 1992.”59 Sellers were generally
located in the northern part of the system, while purchasers were generally located south of the Sacramento Bay Delta.60 Notably, California organized this bank very quickly, and it “provided more than one
million acre-feet of water in the two-year period. [The State] spent
some $100 million on purchases in 1991 and received $68 million in
revenues from purchasers (the difference being accounted for by the
unsold water held in storage in the State Water Project).”61
2. Drought Water Bank, 2009
Anticipating another drought in 2009, the CDWR again instituted a
Drought Water Bank to facilitate water transfers between waterstrapped buyers and willing sellers.62 CDWR sought to purchase water
from willing sellers from water suppliers upstream of the SacramentoSan Joaquin Delta. This water would be transferred using the State
Water Project and would then become “available for purchase by public and private water suppliers in California based on certain needs
criteria as applicable.”63
The Water Bank, however, depended on willing sellers. The CDWR
emphasized this point:
Water will be purchased for the 2009 Drought Water Bank from
willing sellers. Willing sellers may make water available in four
main ways:
– Reservoir releases above normal operations
– Groundwater substitution - using groundwater instead of surface water supplies that are normally used
– Cropland idling - not growing a crop (above normal fallowing
practices) that would have been grown except for the water
transfer
– Crop substitution - growing a less water-intensive crop than
would have been planted except for the water transfer[.]64
58. Id. at 188–89 (citing J. LUND ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL. AT DAVIS, RECENT CALIWATER TRANSFERS: EMERGING OPTIONS IN WATER MANAGEMENT 57 (1992)
(Report of the Center for Environmental and Water Resource Engineering)).
59. Id. at 188.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 189.
62. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA’S DROUGHT: 2009
DROUGHT WATER BANK OVERVIEW 2 (2008) (on file with Texas A&M Law Review).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 5.
FORNIA
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Other policies limited who could become a “willing seller.” For example, “[n]o more than 20 percent of the cropland idled in any county
may be considered as a source of transfer water without a detailed
economic analysis of the effects on the overall economy on the county
from which the water is transferred.”65
Most observers consider the 2009 Drought Water Bank a failure,
given California’s goal of using the bank to reallocate water. The
causes are many, but the economics of water rights played a significant role. For example, according to the Sacramento Bee, “‘[m]any
farmers were leery of entering into a complex water deal with the
state, fearing they might be liable for unexpected environmental damages, become ineligible for federal subsidy programs or simply lose
money if the sale fell through.’”66 Perhaps more importantly, the state
simply was not paying enough, at $275 per acre-foot of water, to compete with the profits to be made from rice, a thirsty crop. Indeed, in
part because of a prolonged drought in Australia, rice prices were at
their highest levels in 30 years.67
As a result, the 2009 Drought Water Bank was able to transfer only
82,000 acre-feet of water, far less than the 600,000 acre-feet that the
state government had hoped for.68 Given the Bank’s inability to reallocate enough water to deal with the drought, in February 2009 California Governor Schwarzenegger declared a state of emergency
because of the water shortage69 and asked for a federal disaster area
declaration about four months later.70
California’s 2009 Drought Water Bank thus illustrates one of the
potential weaknesses of voluntary programs to reallocate water during
western droughts—market forces that tempt senior water rights holders away from drought mitigation and into business as usual. Few governments can afford to compete with a world rice shortage that drives
food prices to high levels. Nevertheless, in California in 2009, the
65. Id.
66. David Zetland, The Drought Water Bank Fails, AGUANOMICS (May 20, 2009),
http://www.aguanomics.com/2009/05/drought-water-bank-fails.html [https://perma.cc/
FQ6Z-7MSQ] (quoting Jim Downing, Badly Needed California Water Transfers
Blocked by Economic, Environmental Hurdles, SACRAMENTO BEE).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Press Release, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Office of the Governor of Cal., Governor Schwarzenegger Takes Action to Address California’s Water Shortage (Feb. 27,
2009). To read the Order, see COASTSIDE CTY. WATER DIST., MEETING OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 5055 (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.coastsidewater.org/agendas/
031009agenda/031009SagendaWithAttachments.pdf [https://perma.cc/N94V-NMZR].
70. Press Release, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Office of the Governor of Cal., Governor Schwarzenegger Requests Federal Disaster Declaration, Issues Executive Order to Provide Assistance (June 19, 2009). To read the Order, see Gov.
Schwarzenegger Requests Federal Disaster Declaration, Issues Executive Order to Provide Assistance, WATER EDUC. FOUND. (June 20, 2009), https://www.watereducation
.org/aquafornia-news/gov-schwarzenegger-requests-federal-disaster-declaration-is
sues-executive-order [https://perma.cc/K7UA-HM4V].
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larger public good arguably lost out to private property rights (real or
perceived) in water.
B. The Texas Water Bank and Trust
The Texas Water Development Board (“TWDB”) manages the
Texas Water Bank (“Bank”) and Texas Water Trust (“Trust”), which
the Texas Legislature created in 1993.71 The Bank’s purpose is “to allow for and assist in the voluntary transfer of water rights between
willing buyers and sellers,” while the Trust allows the TWDB to hold
water rights to maintain environmental flows.72
Transfers through the Bank can be either temporary or permanent,73 and “depositors” are protected from having their water rights
cancelled for up to twenty years (specifically, an initial ten-year period
can be extended up to another ten years).74 “Water rights or contractual rights to use water, which may include surface water, groundwater, or water from any source . . . may be deposited in the bank,”75
and the TWDB may charge up to 1% of the right’s value to cover its
administrative expenses.76
Importantly, the Bank is designed particularly to facilitate transfers
of water rights from agriculture to urban water supply and other uses.
Thus, “[t]he TWDB may implement water conservation measures in
irrigation districts and deposit the resulting water saved into the Texas
Water Bank. The water savings deposited may be transferred to municipalities, industries, and other agricultural users,” with the costs of
conservation efforts paid for through these sales.77
Writing shortly after the Bank’s creation, Ronald Kaiser emphasized that “[t]he Texas Water Bank . . . has the widest legal latitude in
the design and operation of all the western water banks.”78 He projected, based on California’s experience to that point, that “one viable
future for the Texas Water Bank is to function as an emergency bank
during times of drought. As did the California banks, the Texas Bank
could bring together potential buyers and sellers and facilitate the
state approval process for transfers.”79
71. Texas Water Bank & Trust, TEX. WATER DEV. BD., http://www.twdb.texas
.gov/waterplanning/waterbank/index.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
9KNG-MUHA].
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Texas Water Bank, TEX. WATER DEV. BD., http://www.twdb.texas.gov/water
planning/waterbank/bank/index.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/L7J
B-SMHJ].
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Kasler & Sabalow, supra note 38, at 202 (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 202–03 (citations omitted).

R
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Despite this prediction, however, the Texas Water Bank has not matured into a functional mechanism capable of dealing with extreme
drought. As of February 2018, the Bank had only eight deposits,
amounting to a total of slightly more than 500 acre-feet of water, most
of which was available only for lease.80 Thus, “[t]he State of Texas
attempted to establish a forum for making connections through a registry system that, to date, does not appear to have been well utilized.”81 Indeed, no water rights at all transferred through the Bank in
its first six years.82 Like California’s 2009 Drought Water Bank, therefore, the Texas Water Bank demonstrates that voluntary methods of
water rights reallocation do not always do what legislatures and observers hope that they will, limiting their usefulness as emergency
drought relief mechanisms.
IV. THE DOCTRINE

OF

PUBLIC NECESSITY

Water banks function primarily as “carrots,” offering water rights
holders an opportunity to make money from water rights that they
might not otherwise be profitably using—either as an ordinary business evaluation, as in Texas, or because a drought makes the permitted use impossible or unprofitable, as in California. However, as was
true in both states, these voluntary programs cannot guarantee that
more senior water rights holders will make water available for drinking water supply during extreme drought.
This Section explores another possibility, which functions as the
“stick”—the doctrine of public necessity. Public necessity is a common
law doctrine, generally considered inherent in all property rights, that
allows governments facing emergencies to rearrange and destroy
those property rights. As such, public necessity arguably provides
western states and their water agencies with the legal power to force
80. Current Water Bank Deposits, TEX. WATER DEV. BD., http://www.twdb.texas
.gov/waterplanning/waterbank/bank/deposits.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/8VAB-5PBZ]. See also Aileen M. Hocks, Water Sourcing and Pricing, 2
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. No. 6A, at 6A-10 (2016) (“At present, there are only eight
deposits in the water banks, with the most recent listing having a 2009 date.”).
81. Hocks, supra note 80.
82. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of
Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 361 (2000). Lack
of proper incentive may be the reason for the Bank’s failure:
This result is due in large part to three main factors. First, the Texas Water
Bank primarily operates as an information clearinghouse, including a list of
sellers and buyers, which makes transactions outside the bank easier, and
makes data on the true influence of the bank incomplete. Second, cancellation is not well enforced in Texas, and without enforcement, protection from
cancellation does not offer much incentive. Third, the protection is not absolute. The statute only requires that depositing the water right in the bank be
considered, not that it is determinative.
Adam Schempp, Western Water in the 21st Century: Policies and Programs That
Stretch Supplies in a Prior Appropriation World, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,394, 10,407 (Apr. 2010).
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involuntary re-prioritization of appropriative water rights during a severe drought.
A. Public Necessity in General
At the state level, the basis for most regulation is the police power,
which supports regulation to promote public health, safety, and welfare.83 Ordinary exercises of the police power, however, are subject to
the workings of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, which the
U.S. Supreme Court made applicable to the states and their subdivisions through the Fourteenth Amendment.84 Since the early twentieth
century, takings jurisprudence has included regulatory takings, with
the result that state and local governments might have to pay property
owners if regulation that limits property use goes “too far.”85 Potential
liability for regulatory takings is one reason that California looks for
willing sellers to supply its drought banks.
The public necessity doctrine, in contrast, recognizes that in times of
true emergency, private rights yield to public needs, with no need for
the acting government to pay.86 Importantly, public necessity is a
background principle of common law inherent in all private property
rights. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, “the common law had
long recognized that in times of imminent peril—such as when fire
threatened a whole community—the sovereign could, with immunity,
destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives
of many more could be saved.”87 Even Justice Antonin Scalia, writing
for the majority of the Court, recognized public necessity as a background principle of property law that constitutes a defense to constitutional takings claims.88
As a legal doctrine, public necessity has two meanings. In its broad
meaning, the public necessity doctrine acts as the umbrella classification for three common law defenses to takings or damages liability.
83. Baer v. City of Bend, 292 P.2d 134, 137 (Or. 1956) (“It cannot be successfully
contended that the exercise of the police power for the protection of the public
health . . . is restricted to situations of overriding public necessity or emergency or
infectious or contagious diseases . . . .”).
84. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 n.1 (2005) (citing Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).
85. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922).
86. Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 73 (1853) (“At such times, the individual rights of
property give way to the higher laws of impending necessity.”).
87. United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952). Prosser explained
further:
Where the danger affects the entire community, or so many people that the
public interest is involved, that interest serves as a complete justification to
the defendant who acts to avert the peril to all. . . . This notion does not
require the “champion of the public” to pay for the general salvation out of
his own pocket. The number of persons who must be endangered in order to
create a public necessity has not been determined by the courts.
PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 24 (5th ed. 1984).
88. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16 (1992).
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For example, in 1978 the South Dakota Supreme Court laid out this
sense of the doctrine:
There are three important exceptions to the requirement of compensation where, without the owner’s consent, private property is
intentionally, purposefully or deliberately taken or damaged for the
public use, benefit or convenience. They are the taking or destruction of property (1) during actual warfare; (2) to prevent an imminent public catastrophe; and (3) to abate a public nuisance. In each
instance, the power to “take or damage” without compensation is
based upon the public necessity of preventing an impending hazard
which threatens the lives, safety, or health of the general public.89

More recently, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama relied on this broader conception of public necessity to insulate
a nuisance abatement action from takings liability, emphasizing that
“it is settled that in the exercise of the police power a State ‘may take,
damage, or destroy private property without compensation, when the
public necessity, the public health, or the public safety require it to be
done.’”90
More narrowly, but more commonly, the doctrine refers to the second of these three defenses—property rights destruction “to prevent
an imminent public catastrophe.”91 Moreover, two facets of this narrower conception of the public necessity doctrine limit its application:
(1) the requirement of a public necessity or emergency; and (2) the
requirement that the destruction or limitation of private property be
reasonably necessary to address that threat. The next two subsections
address each of these requirements in turn.

89. City of Rapid City v. Boland, 271 N.W.2d 60, 65 (S.D. 1978). Other courts and
some scholars have also viewed public necessity as a broader umbrella doctrine. See,
e.g., Patel v. City of Everman, 179 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, pet. denied)
(“Where a plaintiff establishes that a governmental entity intentionally destroyed his
property because of a real or supposed public emergency, the government entity may
then defend its actions by proof of a great public necessity. In other words, the governmental entity has to show that the property destroyed was a nuisance on the day it
was destroyed.”) (citations omitted); City of Chicago v. Birnbaum, 274 N.E.2d 22, 24
(Ill. 1971) (upholding the destruction of vacant buildings against a takings claim because “[t]he record indicates that the public welfare, health and safety of the surrounding area was imperiled by these circumstances, and the city properly and of
public necessity exercised its police power and abated this nuisance by ordering the
buildings demolished.”); John Alan Cohan, Private and Public Necessity and the Violation of Property Rights, 83 N.D. L. REV. 651, 690–732 (2007).
90. Ashe v. City of Montgomery, 654 F.Supp.2d 1311, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 2010)
(quoting Hulen v. City of Corsicana, 65 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir. 1933)).
91. City of Rapid City, 271 N.W.2d at 65; see also Scott v. City of Del Mar, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 317, 322 (1997) (distinguishing “public necessity and to avert impending
peril” from non-emergency nuisances).
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B. The Requirement that a Public Necessity or Emergency Exists
In the classic application of the public necessity doctrine, an imminent disaster, such as a fire92 or flood,93 threatens the community, and
destruction of private property is necessary to protect the community
as a whole.94 Nevertheless, the concepts of “emergency” and “imminence” can vary among jurisdictions. Some commentators, for example, put more emphasis on the “necessity” than on the “emergency,”
explaining that:
The right to destroy under such circumstances is a natural right
which springs from the necessity of the case. Where, therefore, it is
sought by statute to add to the right or to create the right to destroy
in case of emergency rather than necessity, such attempt constitutes
an exercise of the power of eminent domain and compensation must
be made.95

In contrast, both the Restatement (Second) of Torts and most courts
emphasize the “imminence” and “emergency” aspects of the public
necessity doctrine. The Restatement, for example, states that “[o]ne is
privileged to enter land in the possession of another if it is, or if the
actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting an imminent public disaster.”96 Similarly, the South Dakota Supreme Court noted that “[o]nce the impending disaster has passed,
the government may not rely upon the doctrine of necessity to justify
the subsequent destruction of property.”97
Some courts have also been skeptical about applying the doctrine to
longer-term, preemptive protection efforts. For example, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon determined that the potential for
92. See, e.g., Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1879) (discussing the
common-law right to destroy property to prevent a fire from spreading); Field v. City
of Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575, 577 (1874) (noting that the right to the destruction of
property to prevent the spread of fire is established in the common law); Surocco v.
Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 73 (1853) (discussing the need to destroy a building to check the
progress of a fire); Am. Print Works v. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 590, 602 (N.J. 1851) (stating that there is a right to destroy property in order to arrest the spread of fire); Hale
v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714, 734 (N.J. 1848) (holding that there is a private right to
destroy a building in order to prevent mass destruction by a fire).
93. See generally Dudley v. Orange County, 137 So. 2d 859, 861–63 (Fla. 1962)
(denying injunctive relief against county’s action to dam waters that were causing
flooding on the plaintiff’s land); McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 305 P.2d 1097, 1100
(Utah 1957) (holding that city is not liable for damages incurred by measures taken to
control an extraordinary flood); Short v. Pierce County, 78 P.2d 610, 616 (Wash. 1938)
(holding that “appellants may not recover for damage caused by acts of agents of the
county in an attempt to control immediate danger from the flood”); Atken v. Village
of Wells River, 40 A. 829, 830 (Vt. 1898) (finding that a taking had not occurred when
the plaintiff’s property was destroyed to avert imminent injury from flooding).
94. Cohan, supra note 89, at 653.
95. City of Rapid City v. Boland, 271 N.W.2d 60, 66 (S.D. 1978) (quoting 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.43[1] and [2]); see also Hale, 21 N.J.L. at 729 (noting that
the right is “founded upon necessity and not expediency”).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1995).
97. City of Rapid City, 271 N.W.2d at 66.
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a dockside grain elevator to explode as a result of a nearby ship fire
was not sufficiently imminent to justify setting the ship adrift because
it was “highly improbable that a spark could have been carried from
the ship to the grain gallery since a steady drizzle was falling and the
wind was blowing away from the dock. The fire was small and confined to the engine room.”98
C. The Requirement that the Destruction or Limitation
Is Reasonably Necessary
Regardless of the emergency’s seriousness, public necessity is not an
open license for governments to destroy private property. Instead,
courts require that destructive actions be reasonably necessary given
the particular emergency being addressed. In the words of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon, “[t]he defense applies only
when the emergency justifies the action and when the defendant acts
reasonably under the circumstances.”99
As one example, the real need for flood control did not excuse the
Los Angeles County Flood Control District from paying for damage
to a resident’s property when the immediate cause of the damage was
the District’s poor drainage design and construction.100 The California
Second District Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s award of
damages to the plaintiff for a physical taking of the plaintiff’s property, emphasizing that “the courts will be slow to invoke the doctrine
of police power to protect public agencies in those cases where damage to private parties can be averted by proper construction and
proper precautions in the first instance.”101 As a policy matter,
“‘[u]nnecessary damage to his property is of no benefit to the public;
rather it only entails unwarranted sacrifice and loss on the individual’s
part, which should be compensable damage.’”102 Similarly, public necessity was no defense to casting loose a burning ship when a dockside
98. Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 585 F. Supp.
1062, 1067 (D. Or. 1984). However, the facts that emergency workers ordered the
defendant not to release the ship, that the fire could have probably been contained,
and that both firefighters’ lives and the ship were lost as a result of the defendant’s
overly hasty action probably influenced the court’s seemingly stringent view of imminence. See id. at 1064–65. As the court remarked, the defendant’s “perversity turned a
small shipboard fire into a marine disaster.” Id. at 1068.
99. Protectus, 585 F. Supp. at 1067. Applying the public necessity doctrine can
involve a form of risk-benefit analysis. See Cohan, supra note 89, at 654 (“Under the
necessity doctrine, there is a weighing of interests: the act of invasion of another’s
property is justified under the necessity doctrine only if done to protect or advance
some private or public interest of a value greater than, or at least equal to, that of the
interest invaded.”).
100. Ward Concrete Prods. Co. v. L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 309 P.2d 546, 548
(Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
101. Id. at 551.
102. Id. (quoting House v. L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 153 P.2d 950, 953 (Cal.
1944)) (emphasis in original).
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“grain facility could have been protected by much less drastic
methods.”103
Nevertheless, actors often enjoy more leeway as to what constitutes
“reasonable” and “necessary” destruction in the actual throes of an
emergency. In the early 20th century, for example, the King’s Bench
in England excused a gamekeeper’s decision to start a backfire in order to stop a larger fire, even though it turned out that the backfire
was not actually necessary, because there was “a real and imminent
danger” and the backfire was a reasonable response under those
emergency circumstances.104 Almost ninety years later, the California
Court of Appeals similarly explained the relevance of an existing
emergency as follows:
In situations in which the state must take steps necessary to quell an
emergency, it must be able to act with speed and confidence, unhampered by fear of tort liability. A state of emergency imposes
severe time constraints, forcing decisions to be made quickly and
often without sufficient time to carefully analyze all potential
repercussions.105

As a result, given the exigent circumstances involved, a California
Reclamation District owed no compensation for damages resulting
when it cut a levee in order to prevent “potentially massive flooding”
as a result of a severe storm.106
D. The Doctrine of Public Necessity and Drought
Remarkably, although governments and courts often invoke the
doctrine of public necessity in the context of floods, it has rarely been
applied in the context of drought. In an exception to this rule, in 1871,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had to decide whether the City of
Philadelphia, facing a severe drought, was liable to boatmen for taking
so much water from the Schuylkill River that the City impeded navigation.107 Notably, the court emphasized that “[i]f it could have been
shown that it was this supply for domestic purposes only, which occasioned the insufficiency for navigation, then the law of a paramount
necessity would have existed, and have brought into play the doctrine
of riparian rights, and justified the taking.”108 Instead, the City took
the water to drive water wheels, not for public water supply.109 Be103. Protectus, 585 F. Supp. at 1068; see also Barton-Barnes, Inc. v. State of New
York, 583 N.Y.S.2d 547, 548 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (upholding an award of damages
when state officials destroyed a PCB-contaminated vehicle rather than undertaking
reasonable efforts to eradicate the toxic contamination).
104. Cope v. Sharpe, (No. 2) [1912] 1 KB 496, 504.
105. Thousand Trails, Inc. v. Cal. Reclamation Dist. No. 17, 124 Cal. App. 4th 450,
458 (2004).
106. Id. at 464.
107. City of Philadelphia v. Collins, 68 Pa. 106, 121–22 (1871).
108. Id. at 123.
109. Id. at 124.
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cause “[w]ater-power was forbidden when navigation required” the
water, the City was liable.110
More recently, the California Second District Court of Appeals had
to contemplate whether the City of San Luis Obispo could rely on the
doctrine of public necessity—or, as California terms it, the emergency
police power—to avoid inverse condemnation liability for subsidence
it caused through groundwater pumping.111 Although the City was
facing drought conditions at the time, it had known since at least 1985
that its water supply was running out and would become critical by
1989.112 In 1989, it instituted emergency groundwater pumping and
contemplated building a desalination plant.113 The pumping caused
the plaintiff’s land to subside, leading to litigation in 1991.114 The City
claimed, among other things, that it was insulated from liability under
its emergency police powers.
The court did not agree. As it noted, “The emergency exception is
limited. It operates to avert impending peril.”115 Emphasizing that
California law required a true emergency for the doctrine to apply,116
the court concluded:
The City was well aware of the need to conserve water for years. It
chose a combination of mild conservation measures and the damaging groundwater pumping. This choice of action over the years does
not constitute an emergency. It constituted a choice among many
that the City made over a considerable period of time. As such, the
City may not rely on its police powers to avoid compensation for
the physical destruction of LOVA’s buildings due to its groundwater
pumping operations.117

This California decision articulates well what the relationship between municipal water planning and the availability of the public necessity doctrine should be in order to incentivize responsible
government action. Cities and counties must actively engage in water
supply planning—including drought planning—and impose water conservation measures before the public necessity defense becomes available during drought. Of course, rearranging appropriative water rights
occurs at the state level, not the municipal level. Nevertheless, state
water agencies in western states should still evaluate city planning and
conservation efforts before allowing municipal water use to continue
out of priority. Specifically, municipalities that were unwilling to plan,
enforce conservation measures, or secure any alternative water sup110. Id. at 125–26.
111. Los Osos Valley Assocs. v. City of San Luis Obispo, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1670,
1680 (2d Dist. 1995).
112. Id. at 1674–76.
113. Id. at 1676.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1680.
116. Id. at 1680–81 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 1681.
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plies ought to bear the costs of securing water in drought emergencies
as the price of the municipalities’ failure or refusal to prepare—albeit
still with some limited exception in state law for situations in which
people face actual threats to life.
Conversely, if a city has both done all the planning and supply management allowed under state water law and imposed serious water
conservation requirements on its residents as the drought progresses,
public necessity should be a tool in the state water agency’s repertoire
for dealing with extreme drought. When water supplies are exhausted
and there is insufficient water to support all competing uses, a drought
can qualify as a state of emergency. Moreover, just like hurricanes and
tornadoes, drought has the ability to put human lives immediately at
risk. At such times, western states need a legal doctrine that allows
them to reallocate water rights to protect human survival, rather than
tolerate a public health crisis while crops flourish and businesses
profit. Logically, public necessity is that doctrine because it empowers
state water agencies to allow a municipality to continue receiving the
amount of water minimally necessary to keep residents alive and
healthy, despite actual legal priorities among water rights.
With that conclusion as a prelude, this Article returns to the Brazos
River drought and the TCEQ’s decision to continue junior water
rights for municipal water supply and power generation. As the next
Section discusses, the Texas courts have hamstrung the TCEQ in dealing with future life-threatening drought emergencies on a real-time
basis.
V. ALLOWING PUBLIC NECESSITY REALLOCATIONS OF WATER
DURING DROUGHT: THE BRAZOS RIVER DECISIONS
A. The Contextual Nature of Water Rights
Traditionally, water rights have not been considered the same kind
of “property” as either land or personal property.118 Scholars often
118. Stephen Draper has also emphasized that such limitations inhere in the nature
of water itself:
Because they are irreplaceable source waters, the earth’s surface water (rivers, streams, lakes, and wetlands) and groundwater (aquifers) are unique
natural resources. Unlike oil or minerals, life-sustaining flowing water is a
shared, mobile, common-pool resource that is used and reused for different
purposes as it moves through the hydrological cycle. Prior to capture by
withdrawal or diversion, a claim of exclusive ownership of water is difficult
to sustain.
Stephen E. Draper, The Unintended Consequences of Tradable Property Rights to
Water, 20 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 49, 49 (2005). See also Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of
Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473, 482 (1989) (“Water is not like a
pocket watch or piece of furniture, which an owner may destroy with impunity. The
rights of use in water, however long standing, should never be confused with more
personal, more fully owned, property.”).
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describe property rights in water as both nebulous and complex.119 As
Carol Rose has observed:
If water were our chief symbol for property, we might think of property rights—and perhaps other rights—in quite a different way. We
might think of rights literally and figuratively as more fluid and less
fenced in; we might think of property as entailing less of the awesome Blackstonian power of exclusion and more of the qualities of
flexibility, reasonableness and moderation, attentiveness to others,
and cooperative solutions to common problems.120

Notably, prior appropriation rights are generally considered fairly
limited usufructuary rights—the right to take and use part of a flow,
rather than guaranteed ownership of particular molecules of water. As
the Idaho Supreme Court explained:
A water right does not make the appropriator the owner of the
source of the water, nor does it give the appropriator control over
that source. . . . It does not even make the appropriator the owner
of the water. . . . A water right simply gives the appropriator the
right to the use of the water from that source, which right is superior
to that of later appropriators when there is a shortage of water.121

In addition, prior appropriation anticipates at its core that the ability
to exercise a water right from year to year and season to season depends on the actual hydrological circumstances that exist at the moment of the attempted diversion, and those who are “last in right”
may in fact receive no water if actual stream flows cannot satisfy all
claims.122 As such, appropriative water rights have always been contextual and contingent, and no water right holder has an absolute entitlement to a specific amount of water regardless of the status of the
supply.
Other aspects of water and property law have also always inherently limited appropriative water rights. For example, water rights
holders must put the water to a beneficial use123 and cannot waste
water.124 Prior appropriation is a “use it or lose it” system,125 and
119. See, e.g., David B. Anderson, Water Rights as Property in Tulare v. United
States, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 461, 463 (2007) (“As a species of property, California
water rights are indeed both unconventional and obscure.”); Megan Hennessy, Colorado River Water Rights: Property Rights in Transition, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661, 1665
(2004) (noting that in the Colorado River “[p]rivate parties hold property rights, albeit imperfect ones, in water.”); Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 450 (2008) (arguing “that water
law tends to be a semicommons”).
120. Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329,
351 (1996).
121. Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 156 P.3d 502, 516 (Idaho 2007) (citation
omitted).
122. Cent. Platte Nat. Res. Dist. v. Wyoming, 512 N.W.2d 392, 401 (Neb. Ct. App.
1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 513 N.W.2d 847 (Neb. 1994).
123. ADLER ET AL., supra note 36, at 155–56.
124. Id. at 156, 161–62.
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water rights holders can lose water rights through common law abandonment or statutory forfeiture.126 In some states, water rights are
limited by the state’s public trust doctrine.127 Water rights holders cannot use water to create a nuisance or to cause land subsidence. Senior
water rights—especially downstream water rights like Dow Chemical
Company’s on the Brazos River—can essentially be ignored if the call
for more water is futile,128 which means that cutting off junior water
rights would not result in any more water reaching the senior.
Moreover, like all other private property, water rights are limited
by the doctrine of public necessity. Indeed, applying the doctrine of
public necessity to water rights is far less damaging than the doctrine’s
normal operation. As the discussion in Section III shows, courts have
upheld governments’ decisions under the doctrine of public necessity
for the permanent destruction of houses, boats, crops, trees, and other
valuable property. In contrast, a state water agency need only suspend
water rights for the duration of the drought, allowing those rights to
spring immediately back into legal force when the drought is over. It is
thus difficult to argue that a state water agency could not justify temporarily suspending senior water rights during a drought when lives
and public health are actually at risk. The loss of the property right
would be only temporary, and the water right would become exercisable again without any expense to the holder—although, admittedly,
that holder may have suffered other losses as a result of not being able
to use the water.
B. The Texas Court of Appeals on the Brazos River:
Necessity Has No Place
In its 2015 decision affirming the district court’s ruling against the
TCEQ, a Texas Court of Appeals read the doctrine of public necessity
out of the Texas Water Code. The operative language of section 11.053
states:
During a period of drought or other emergency shortage of water,
as defined by commission rule, the executive director by order may,
in accordance with the priority of water rights established by Section 11.027:
(1) temporarily suspend the right of any person who holds a
water right to use the water; and
(2) temporarily adjust the diversions of water by water rights
holders.129
125. Id. at 186.
126. Id. at 186–87.
127. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological
Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 80–91 (2010).
128. ADLER ET AL., supra note 36, at 185.
129. TEX. WATER CODE § 11.053(a) (West 2011).
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In turn, the referenced section 11.027 provides that “[a]s between appropriators, the first in time is first in right.”130 Thus, as in all other
prior appropriation states, the general rule in Texas is that, in times of
shortage, the state curtails water rights in reverse order of priority.
Nevertheless, another Texas Water Code provision referenced in
section 11.053, section 11.024, states that:
Preference shall be given to . . . domestic and municipal uses, including water for sustaining human life and the life of domestic animals, it being the public policy of the state and for the benefit of the
greatest number of people that in the appropriation of water as
herein defined, the appropriation of water for domestic and municipal uses shall be and remain superior to the rights of the state to
appropriate the same for all other purposes . . . .131

As the TCEQ argued, this preference for preserving life, read in concert with the basic priority principle, would seem to give the TCEQ
sufficient discretion to favor domestic and municipal drinking water
uses during a drought.132 Indeed, it is no stretch to read section 11.024
as preserving a form of the public necessity doctrine, especially considering the public necessity doctrine’s status as a common law background principle of property law and the Texas Water Code’s lack of
an explicit derogation of that principle.
However, the Texas Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi disagreed,
concluding that enforcing water right priorities is an absolute
mandate:
The entire section of 11.053 must be accomplished in accordance
with the priority of water rights established by section 11.027. . . .
No specific language was included that would allow TCEQ to depart from the time priority of 11.027; rather, the statute expressly
states the opposite. . . . The agency’s interpretation would allow senior water rights holders to be suspended before their junior counterparts, which is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.
As such, we decline to defer to TCEQ’s interpretation.133

Nor could the TCEQ draw on the state’s general police power authority to invoke something like the doctrine of public necessity:
While we recognize TCEQ’s authority to manage and regulate the
state’s scarce water resources, such authority must not exceed its
express legislative mandate. We conclude that TCEQ’s police power
and general authority does not allow TCEQ to exempt junior preferred water rights from suspension based on public health, safety,
130. TEX. WATER CODE § 11.027 (West 2008).
131. TEX. WATER CODE § 11.024(1) (West 2008).
132. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. Tex. Farm Bureau, 460 S.W.3d 264, 270–71
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, no pet.).
133. Id. at 270.
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and welfare concerns. Rather, section 11.053 specifically sets forth
the limits of the agency’s powers in times of drought.134

Thus, the court effectively read all flexibility to deal with life-threatening drought emergencies out of the Texas Water Code.
Ironically, Dow’s call on the river was probably futile. Back in 2009,
Dow also called the river, and “[j]unior water rights were suspended
that summer, cutting off mostly farmers and ranchers from using
about 46 billion gallons of water, but no additional water flowed down
to Dow’s pumps.”135 Arguably, therefore, neither the TCEQ nor the
court needed to reach the issue of public necessity—but that is, as
they say, now water under the bridge.
C. Revisiting the Brazos River: Public Necessity and the TCEQ’s
Second Suspension Order
The Texas Court of Appeals’ decision was hailed as a victory for
property rights advocates.136 However, “[p]roperty rights serve human
values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it.”137
Moreover, as noted, Texas’s own Water Code recognizes that domestic and municipal water use—water use for the preservation of lives—
takes highest priority.138
Nevertheless, the November 2012 TCEQ order that the appellate
court reviewed was broad and sweeping—not the tailored, “reasonable measures” approach to emergencies that the doctrine of public
necessity requires, as discussed in Section III. In contrast, in November and December of 2012, the TCEQ sent out questionnaires to all
non-suspended junior water rights holders “requesting water use data
and information related to the entity’s alternative water sources” and
“requesting each non-suspended water right holder to identify the
minimum amount of water necessary for addressing public health and
safety concerns.”139 In response, fourteen holders, including several
cities, indicated that they did not need their Brazos River water at
all,140 while several others responded that they could get by with less
than their full Brazos River allocation.141 Other water rights holders
indicated that the TCEQ could suspend their rights without risking
public health, safety, and welfare.142
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 273 (citation omitted).
Jim Malewitz, supra note 22.
Id.
State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971).
TEX. WATER CODE § 11.024 (West 2008).
TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ORDER MODIFYING AN ORDER SUSPENDING WATER RIGHTS ON THE BRAZOS RIVER 2 ¶¶ 5, 6 (Jan. 15, 2013), https://
www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/response/drought/water-right-letters/01-15-13Braz
os-muni.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BW6-AM3D].
140. Id. at 2 ¶ 7.
141. Id. at 3–4, ¶¶ 8–16.
142. Id. at 4 ¶ 17.
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As a result, in its January 2013 modification order, the TCEQ tailored its suspensions of junior water rights to the municipalities’ actual
water needs, curtailing several junior municipal and power generation
water rights to reflect the agency’s more nuanced assessment of the
drought’s true impact on public health.143 To maintain flexibility in the
face of an uncertain drought future, however, the TCEQ also allowed
that a suspended municipality could revisit the curtailment if evolving
needs for drinking water or fire suppression water so required.144 Further, it identified water levels at various gauge stations that indicated
that temporarily increased flows could allow for exercise of suspended
water rights without interfering with Dow’s senior water rights.145 The
TCEQ incorporated these same tailored suspensions into its July 2013
suspension order.146
The TCEQ thus learned to deal with drought by identifying true
public exigencies and taking tailored and reasonable measures to address them while still preserving water rights priorities to the extent
possible without endangering public health and drinking water supplies. Nevertheless, given that the Texas courts categorically prohibited the TCEQ from implementing such a nuanced and flexible
response, Texas communities are likely to suffer in future droughts
even as less life-sustaining water uses continue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Agriculture and water-dependent businesses are not the bad actors
in western water law, nor does this Article intend to suggest that they
are. Indeed, in a complex world with a changing climate, far more
attention needs to be paid to national and global food security. This
attention should include, perhaps, a reassessment of what we grow
and where; the impacts of drought on agriculture can, ultimately, also
become a threat to human survival. For example, a recent article summarized the impacts of the 2012–2016 California drought on California agriculture as follows:
From 2012–2016 California experienced the most severe drought—
including the driest single year, 2014—in the last 1200 years. Statewide costs to California’s agricultural sector in 2015 were estimated
at $2.7 billion, along with some 21,000 workers impacted by either
direct or indirect job losses. Agriculture largely rode out the
drought by continuing to deplete the already vastly overdrafted
groundwater, but at a cost of $590 million in that year alone. Statewide figures mask the uneven socioeconomic impacts of the
drought, which fell disproportionately on agricultural areas south of
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 7–9 ¶¶ 4–13, 9–10 ¶¶ 1–10.
Id. at 11 ¶ 11.
Id. at 11–12, ¶ 14.
See generally TCEQ JULY 2013 BRAZOS RIVER ORDER, supra note 31.
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the Sacramento/San Joaquin Bay Delta in the San Joaquin
Valley.147

Nevertheless, the need for an improved, drought-sensitive agricultural
policy in the United States does not eliminate the recurring exigencies
of droughts on human health and survival, especially during the truly
severe droughts that can pose an immediate threat to “survival
water”—the water that humans need to avoid public health crises.
Experts have long recognized the inequities of strict prior appropriation law.148 Application of that doctrine to allow the growing of lowvalue crops like alfalfa—or, as on the Brazos River, the extraction of
magnesium from seawater—while water-starved residents pay exorbitant prices to truck in water from elsewhere, elevates black-letter
water law over the human values that all property law is intended to
serve. The common law employed the doctrine of public necessity as a
rebalancing stick available in true emergencies, and western states
would be wise to incorporate that doctrine as a part of their prior
appropriation law.
147. Sugg, supra note 48, at 1.
148. Id. at 3, 16.
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